Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 20, 2026

We often get big stories wrong - be a skeptic?


 

Big stories that media and analysts got wrong from a number of sources. Here are some highlights, yet we have to ask the question - should you be a skeptic? What is the cost of being a skeptic? 

Enron (2001)

Global Crossing (2002) 
WorldCom (2002)
New Century Financial (2007)
Bear Stearns (2008) 
Lehman Brothers (2008)
Luckin Coffee (2020)
Wirecard (2020)
Silicon Valley Bank (2023)
First Republic Bank (2023)

| 1 | Lehman Brothers | ~$691 billion | September 2008 | Investment Banking |
| 2 | Washington Mutual | ~$328 billion | September 2008 | Banking / Savings |
| 3 | WorldCom | ~$104 billion | July 2002 | Telecommunications |
| 4 | General Motors | ~$91 billion | June 2009 | Automotive |
| 5 | CIT Group | ~$80 billion | November 2009 | Commercial Lending |
| 6 | Enron | ~$65.5 billion | December 2001 | Energy / Trading |
| 7 | Conseco | ~$61 billion | December 2002 | Insurance / Finance |
| 8 | MF Global | ~$41 billion | October 2011 | Brokerage / Derivatives |
| 9 | Chrysler | ~$39 billion | April 2009 | Automotive |
| 10 | Thornburg Mortgage | ~$36.5 billion | May 2009 | Mortgage Lending |
| 11 | Pacific Gas and Electric | ~$36 billion | January 2019 | Utilities |
| 12 | Texaco | ~$35.9 billion | April 1987 | Oil and Gas |
| 13 | FGIC | ~$26 billion | August 2010 | Bond Insurance |
| 14 | Refco | ~$33 billion | October 2005 | Brokerage / Futures |
| 15 | Bed Bath and Beyond | ~$4.4 billion | April 2023 | Retail |



Thursday, October 8, 2026

Les vigilantes obligataires in Europe

 





As much as there is concern about rising interest rates and debt in the United States, it is a global problem, with countries with rising debt-to-GDP ratios seeing significant increases in rates relative to other countries. The current European poster child is France. Along with "school" protests/riots, there has been a significant increase in credit spreads relative to Germany and other major European countries. The reason is clear. There is no action on high debt levels. Les vigilantes obligataires are alive and present. 

The important global issues are clear: 
  • Debt levels do matter, and investors want a premium for unsafe assets.
  • There is no way that country-specific debt can serve as an alternative safe asset.
This is a market warning that cannot be solved in the near term regardless of energy costs. 




Wednesday, September 9, 2026

Net interest and entitlement 98.4% of tax receipts

 

This is a crazy number - over 98% of all Federal Government Receipts go to net interest and entitlements. Only 2% of tax receipts cover the other expenses, the real activity of government. Put differently, we pay for all our non-entitlement programs, like the military, by borrowing money. I don’t think the American public knows this. I don’t think they may care. We aren’t even accounting for future commitments we have made that we will not have the money for. 

The only good news is that entitlements and net interest, if held by domestic investors, can be viewed as a large transfer payment with deadweight costs. We borrow from citizens who then pay taxes to meet the interest payment. We tax citizens and then give the money back to other citizens. Significant money moves between taxpayers and entitlement recipients, from one set of consumers who may save more to another set of citizens who spend more. It could be worse, but that doesn’t mean this money is being used productively. It is a great transfer of wealth

Thursday, August 27, 2026

The sobering math of the US bond deficit

 

The US deficit-bond math isn't very attractive. The primary deficit is improving strongly toward levels closer to the 2015-2019 period, but we are not seeing the same improvement in the total deficit, which is now persistently below 5%.

The fiscal primary deficit was 2.6% of GDP for FY2025, but the total deficit was 5.8%. We are away from the pandemic-era extreme deficits, but in a perfect world, some of those extremes should be reversed, not just reduced.  

Tuesday, August 18, 2026

Japan and the big carry trade

 


The yen carry trade has existed for decades. Borrow in cheap Japanese funding markets, sell yen, and then buy the currency of a high-yielding market in some other currency. Of course, hedging and risk management add layers, but the overall strategy is straightforward. Everything works until it does not, because of two things: 1) rates in Japan increase relative to the rest of the world, the yield spread falls; and 2) the yen appreciates, which can wipe out the gains from the spread differential. Now the Bank of Japan is raising rates, and the Finance Ministry is intervening in the yen markets to stop the currency slide. The net effect. is that less money will flow into foreign-yielding markets versus Japan. This will mean global rates will adjust higher.

Global bond markets are changing, and old sources of funding will no longer be available to borrowers. We can expect higher equilibrium real rates. We cannot say what the new rates will be, but the old environment is not working. 




Monday, August 10, 2026

AI investment follows other boom and bust cycles




Booms or bubbles are often associated with excessive investments. The euphoria associated with a new technology or meme leads to significant money flows. But there is a marginal return on the capital that falls as more investment dollars flow into the theme. The excess investment leads to a large capital stock in the new technology that may have significant positives for an economy, yet that does not make it a good investment, especially for those that come late to the investment cycle. Is new money late to the cycle? There is not a definitive answer, yet it is clear that all of the capital chasing returns will not be rewarded and likely will be a bust. 

Canals, railroads, new tech in the 20s, and the dotcom boom all saw significant capital investment, yet for many the rewards were limited.



 

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Did we grow our way out of WWII debt?

 


We are facing a major debt crisis in the US, yet the alarm bells don’t seem to matter. The argument is that we run the economy hot, and stronger growth will get the debt issue under control, or at least allow us to see a decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio. 

The argument for growing our way out of the debt crisis rests on the view that we have seen high debt before and solved it through growth. The WWII debt was huge, but the debt-to-GDP ratio declined during the post-WWII expansion. The COVID debt expansion was like a world war, yet we can solve the problem through strong post-COVID expansion. 

In an interesting paper, “Did the United States Really Grwo out of Its World War II Debt”, we find that this argument may be wrong. Debt/GDP would have declined much less if not for the policies of the pre-Accord peg (financial repression) and the distortion of real rates from surprise inflation. 

The debt/GDP ratio fell from 106 to 23 percent in actual history, but if not for the rate distortions, it would have declined only to 74 percent.


This is an interesting application of counterfactual analysis, yet it is a sobering thought that solving the debt/GDP problem will have to come through surprise inflation and financial repression.

Thursday, February 12, 2026

Bonds are not always a safe asset.



The new paper "Are Government Bonds Safe in time of war and Pandemic?" examines the behavior of bonds during periods of war and other non-financialcrises. Not surprisingly, there is a difference. Wars are associated with sharp declines in real returns and with returns that lag growth. The reasons are clear. There is elevated surprise inflation during a war, and governments impose financial repression, which creates a wedge between real returns and grwoth/. The bondholders bear the cost of war, even relative to risky assets. That is not the case during a financial crisis or a pandemic. Pandemics are similar to war in that they entail labor supply constraints, trade restrictions, a surge in spending, and significant increases in central bank balance sheets. 

All risks are not equal. Bonds are not always safe. The assumption that government bodies are always safe will be costly. Now, the war scenario may be easy to adapt to, but the real question is whether there are other government or geopolitical-induced events that are adverse for bonds. That is the real current question. When is the environment not safe for bonds? 




Friday, January 9, 2026

Howard Marks on bubbles - thoughtful advice


It is good to get some perspective on the current bubble discussion across assets. The following comments from Howard Marks provide useful insights that are evenhanded yet focus thinking on the problem. These excerpts are from a longer letter with sage advice on how to think through the AI bubble and associated thinking on financing data centers.

I’ve concluded there are two different but interrelated bubble possibilities to think about: one in the behavior of companies within the industry, and the other in how investors are behaving with regard to the industry.

Newness plays a huge part in this. Because there’s no history to restrain the imagination, the future can appear limitless for the new thing. And futures that are perceived to be limitless can justify valuations that go well beyond past norms – leading to asset prices that aren’t justified on the basis of predictable earning power.

The key thing to note here is that the new thing understandably inspires great enthusiasm, but bubbles are what happen when the enthusiasm reaches irrational proportions.

Struggling with whether to apply the “bubble” label can bog you down and interfere with proper judgment; we can accomplish a great deal by merely assessing what’s going on around us and drawing inferences with regard to proper behavior. 

The key realization seems to be that if people remained patient, prudent, analytical, and value-insistent, novel technologies would take many years and perhaps decades to be built out. Instead, the hysteria of the bubble causes the process to be compressed into a very short period – with some of the money going into life-changing investment in the winners but a lot of it being incinerated.

Debt is neither a good thing nor a bad thing per se. Likewise, the use of leverage in the AI industry shouldn’t be applauded or feared. It all comes down to the proportion of debt in the capital structure; the quality of the assets or cash flows you’re lending against; the borrowers’ alternative sources of liquidity for repayment; and the adequacy of the safety margin obtained by lenders. We’ll see which lenders maintain discipline in today’s heady environment.

I know I don’t know enough to opine on AI. But I do know something about debt, and it’s this:

  • It’s okay to supply debt financing for a venture where the outcome is uncertain.

  • It’s not okay where the outcome is purely a matter of conjecture.

  • Those who understand the difference still have to make the distinction correctly.

from Howard Marks Is It a Bubble? Oaktree Client Letter 

 

 

Monday, December 8, 2025

Bubbles and crash risk is associated with positive expectations

 


There has been more talk about bubbes in the last six months than over the last few years. The paper, "Optimism Everywhere: Beliefs during stock price bubble", focuses on the boom and bust cycle by looking at expectations from analysts. When there is a price surge, analysts forecast exceptional earnings growth and high near-term returns. Short interest will be low, and the overall level of optimism is a strong indicator of future crashes. There are few skeptics during a bubble period. 

This research adds to our bubble story, yet there is a problem of whether optimism leads to price increases or whether price increases create optimism. The line of causality would be beneficial, although it is likely that price increases and optimism are closely linked. Yet it would be helpful to understand why some price increases become bubbles. What is the driver of optimism, and how is optimism spread into price behavior?

Sunday, December 7, 2025

EU fragmentation - the impact on capital markets


Market fragmentation is an issue in the EU. There is not one market for bonds but a set of markets that may move together when there is no crisis, but will then diverge when there is a liquidity issue or a macro shock. The ECB may try to align key bond markets, but there are limits to what it can do without favoring one market over others. This problem is nicely described in the short VOX article, Financial fragmentation as a vulnerability in euro area bond markets.

There is evident fragmentation as outlined by the first and second principal components. The extent of Euro area fragmentation can be measured over time. Although it is lower than during most of the post-GFC period, it is clear that during periods of macroeconomic shocks, fragmentation increases, leading to lower liquidity and greater spread dislocation. It will be hard for the Euro area to produce a safe asset across the EU if there is high fragmentation.   





 
 





Thursday, November 13, 2025

The current credit bezzle

 


With the bankruptcies of First Brands and Tricolor, there are clear signs that we are facing mounting credit issues. More importantly, we are seeing the classic Bezzle described by John Kenneth Galbraith in his book on the 1929 crash. We are not faced with a downturn in the business cycle. There is no recession; however, there is an exuberance that has been described by Minsky in his financial instability hypothesis. When overly optimistic views of the economy are coupled with extreme asset values, there is a higher likelihood that some will take advantage of the situation and cut corners, potentially committing fraud.

A review of the bankruptcies and new reports suggests that, in both cases, there was potential fraud or financial complexity that did not provide debtors with accurate information about the economic health of the firms. If we are seeing this under current healthy conditions, we can imagine more bankruptcies if asset prices fall. This is called the "febezzle" by Charlie Munger, referring to the false wealth created by high asset prices. If prices fall, the excessive wealth will quickly fall.

The key takeaway is that credit risk premiums should increase and investors should be paid more to hold risky debt.


John Kenneth Galbraith and the "bezzle" - It is a global issue


Monday, October 27, 2025

From monetary to fiscal activism or both

 


There are policy regimes that will impact markets. The post-GFC period was focused on monetary policy as the key tool, with quantitative easing and extremely low rates (negative in some countries). This was also a period of fiscal austerity, with governments not attempting to push debt-to-GDP levels to extremes. There were, of course, exceptions. The pandemic also saw quantitative easing used again to avert a crisis, along with fiscal policy as an additional tool. This was clearly the case in the US, with what may have been considered temporary turning into something that looks more permanent. 

The switch to more aggressive fiscal policy affects the central bank's independence and alters the credit risk exposure for many investors. The cost of financing is an issue, as well as the potential term premium needed to attract bond investors. The potential for a credit crisis is heightened. Indeed, there is a change in the relative safety of different sovereign debts.

Wednesday, October 22, 2025

How countries go broke - cycles or one bad policy after another

 


Ray Dalio's new book, How Countries Go Broke - The Big Cycle, is a continuation of his earlier work on credit and debt cycles across history. In some sense, what he is proposing is not new but a reformulation of many of his past ideas. Dalio is neither a historian nor a macroeconomist but a successful practitioner who has studied credit markets and debt cycles as deeply as anyone. If you are expecting a deep history of debt cycles, as one would in an academic treatise, think again. 

Through narrative, many charts and tables, and highlights from Dalio, you are reading the argument he has for big credit cycles mixed with smaller cycles. He believes there are clear, recurring cycles that are predictable through repeating patterns of excessive credit, which must be adjusted through changes in monetary policy and structural reforms. Credit cannot be separated from money creation and policies. Excess credit can be addressed, but it will be painful. In the case of excess government debt, the options are spending cuts, tax increases, or inflation. Much of the theory is well known, but Dalio focuses on the behavioral patterns that create a cycle. 

The strident tone of Dalio may be off-putting, but he clearly formulates his arguments, and you can then debate the specifics. If you are worried about debt cycles, this is a book worth reading to frame future discussions on how debt cycles may collapse.

Sunday, October 19, 2025

Cockroach Theory and credit risk

 





Regional banks are under stress based on the "cockroach theory" of credit. If you find one, there usually are more. If we have one credit problem with short-term and factor lending, there usually will be other firms that may have a problem. Credit problems are generally not just one-off. There can be fraud in some cases, but fraud is usually caused by stress in the system. Firms may not plan fraud. They are forced to cut corners, which generally leads to illegal action. One cut corner leads to others, which leads to cover-ups. 

Smaller banks have diversified portfolios, but a loss across several business sectors can have an impact on earnings and impair the sale of loans. We are not near the earlier lows in April associated with tariffs. Again, selling is based on higher uncertainty.

 

Cockroach Theory or "It's just one darn thing followed by another"

Friday, October 17, 2025

No room for error in the bond market - First Brands carryover

 



There is no room for error in the corporate bond market. Look at the spreads: the market is pricing in very little corporate debt risk. 

That tightness may be changing with the First Brands failure. Most corporate debt does not present the problems associated with First Brands, but we now have an environment where every credit manager is conducting a full review of their portfolio. Go back to basics, as there's FOMO around credit. 

The FOMO of a credit event. You want to be the investor who avoids risk, so it is time to start reducing risk exposure, especially in the high-yield space. If there is a credit problem with First Brands, there is likely to be problems somewhere else. There will be specific credit risks for firms that may have to rollover debt in the next year. Short-term debt should be less risky, except when there is a near-term credit problem or a threat of new funds not being available. If bank lines are cut, some firms will have less funding in the short run. 

Tuesday, October 7, 2025

Perception on Public Debt and Policy - Not very encouraging

 


A recent IMF paper, "Perception of Public Debt and Policy: Evidence from Cross Country Surveys," examines the responses of 27,000 participants to assess their knowledge and beliefs about how government debt influences expectations of tax and expenditure policy changes. Individuals often underestimate their debt levels, especially in countries with high debt, and the burden of fiscal adjustments will disproportionately affect them. People expect that tax increases will outweigh spending cuts when considering how debt levels can be reduced. 

The most interesting part of the survey is that respondents do not understand the relationship between government expenditures and budget deficits, tax revenues and budget deficits, and budget deficits and government debt. The analysts find that only about 50% of the respondents correctly identify the relationships. There is significant government budget illiteracy.

Most people do not have accurate perceptions of their debt levels. The average person does not understand government budget dynamics, nor do they appreciate the current levels of debt.





Sunday, September 7, 2025

Financial crises are inherent within our system


 

Gary Gorton provides a good history of financial crises in the US financial system from the free banking period to the Great Financial Crisis. These crises are not one-off events but are inherent in our financial system. There will be credit booms and busts,  and our history is filled with them. What is unusual is that we had a long period from the Great Depression to the 1980s when there were no crises. Innovations that change the financial landscape, moral hazard issues, too-big-to-fail, and shortages of bank capital all contribute to liquidity crises and contraction of credit. Through following economic history, we can see how the seeds of crises are sown. Gorton does a good job in this short book of providing the history and theory for why we should always be concerned about the possibility of a financial crisis.

Thursday, August 7, 2025

The next credit crisis - student loans again?


Corporate spreads are at all-time lows and household finances seem to be in good shape, but there is one area of concern - student loans. There was an extended moratorium on student loan payments during the Biden Administration due to the COVID pandemic, but that is in the past. Borrowers now have to pay up, and the bailouts are not there. The result has been an increase in delinquencies. This is especially the case for older borrowers who are nearing retirement. We are not at a crisis, but this is an area of concern that impacts spending and the ability of these consumers to take on any other debt. 




Thursday, June 19, 2025

Corporate bond stress falling - what will it take to change spreads?



Despite all of the noise in politics, policy uncertainty, and geopolitical tensions, corporate bond spreads have fallen to levels seen at the beginning of the year. While there was a significant increase in stress in April, overall stress levels remain below the peak during the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the market is sensitive to changes in policies that will impact earnings; yet, corporate buyers have overlooked these risk and uncertainty issues. The next test will be softness in the real economy, yet the link between economic uncertainty and spread risk does not seem strong.