Friday, May 1, 2020

Equities signal recovery is underway - Where is the recovery?



Equities are forward-looking and discount future earnings. They will peak and reverse before the real economic numbers. The large April return reversal, up 12.8 percent for the month, is sending a message of optimism that seems premature. There is no national agreement on reversing the Great Lockdown. A state by state opening will ensure that any reversal will not be a single step process but a gradual stair step process. Confidence is down. Investment is down. Consumer spending is down. Unemployment is expected to hit 16 percent with the next report. All of these economic declines have generally been greater than anticipated by the market forecasts.

What is driving equities are the non-real measures that drive markets. Volatility is declining. Financial stress as measured by the Fed bank stress indices is falling. Economic policy and equity market uncertainty as measured by news indices have stabilized or are falling. The Chicago Fed financial conditions index has improved from highs in March. These numbers indicate room for optimism.

While earnings have been reported for the first quarter, they show only a partial impact from COVID-19, so it is hard to tell what the rest of 2020 will look like. The full impact of the lockdown will not show in the numbers until July. We have to rely on investor optimism over current real data pessimism if this rally is to continue.  


Wednesday, April 29, 2020

Alternative investments - Return dispersion is costly


Dispersion can be function of misclassification. When things are wrongly bundled, there will be a greater dispersion. However, dispersion can also be related to differentiation in skill. If there is a wide dispersion in ability, there will be a wide dispersion in results. Of course, in a market economy, those with poor skill should be dropped from the performance set through failure. In the long-run that will be true, but in the shorter-run there may be inertia with firms leading to failure. 

What the CAIA chart for a given year shows is that some \investment sectors will have more return dispersion than others. You get paid for finding winners in alternatives. You don't get paid much for searching for winners in public fixed income. 

Using a benchmark or median firm is not that costly in terms of leaving money on the table by not finding the top quartile firm or by picking the wrong firm who falls in the bottom quartile. The penalty for being wrong or suffering from regret is higher for private equity or venture capital. More due diligence time and effort have to be placed in the alternative investment sectors. Choosing the average firm does not buy you much for performance. Investors have to go big on due diligence or go home.   

Monday, April 27, 2020

Forecasts, Regime Changes, and Rational Expectations


The economy has now changed forever. It is an often-overused phrase, but in this case, it is true. Look at any macro time series and there is a multi-standard deviation shift down. Call it the COVID-19 recession or the Great Lockdown, it does not matter, the shift changes all forecasting given the size and speed. There was no trend lower. It has been a falling off of a cliff event. This shock is not just a low probability event conjured in our minds. It has happened and now forecasts, and the use of data have to be recalibrated. 

Any forecast of the future that employs past data to extrapolate into the future is wrong and not rational. Moving averages on fundamentals are problematic.  If you are doing that, stop now. Any data based on pre-March information, is irrelevant for near-term analysis. While assets prices declined with the fundamentals, the post shock links will be harder to calibrate.

There was a structural break that cut the link with past data and forecasts. The work on forecasting time series with structural breaks does not provide easy solutions. The focus of most research has been on finding breaks and regime changes and not dealing with how to forecast after the break occurs.

Look at the Jim Stock's weekly economic indicator index (WEI) that is a good example of nowcasting. It is forecasting a double-digit real decline in GDP. This forecast is useful, but the question is how to calibrate new information that can be mapped to asset returns. How do you effectively use the pre-March data?


Initial jobless claims have exploded, but what will be the meaning of a slight decline over the next few weeks. It will be good economic news, but can it be translated into a stock or rate sensitivity that has meaning versus sensitivities in a pre-COVID19 world. There is a significant shadow effect if one looks at say a 12-week moving average. After the last twelfth week rolls off, the new series has disconnected behavior with the past. We are dealing with a high degree of model uncertainty.   

Expectations have to be forward looking and use all current information. Adaptive expectations will not cut it, but rational expectations seem somewhat vacuous. In rational expectations, economic agents know how the economy works and these expectations impact the future economic results. There will be mistakes but expectations, on average, will be correct. This sounds good, but what does it mean in a new economic reality. Expectations will impact markets, but it will not be based on knowing the economy. It will be related to rational beliefs based on competing models that may seem rational but cannot all be correct.

Some simple rules: 
  • Models are now highly uncertain, so an ensemble of models which evolve will be useful. Those models that fail or reveal to be useless should be dropped.
  • Work with survey data or data that has short look-back and not subject to revisions. 
  • Focus on nowcast across a number of variables and limit look-back on times series.
  • Highlight structural regime changes from policy to maintain forward-looking forecasts. Use theory to extrapolate the policy impact.
  • Conduct and place more weight on scenario analysis. Think of alternative policy and economic outcomes and then handicap.



Alternative risk premia match well versus hedge funds


What is a hedge fund? From an investment and risk perspective, a hedge fund is a combination of factor styles and risk premia formed within an investment fund. There may be skill through the generation of unique returns or alpha, but as investors become better at decomposing risk factors, it becomes more apparent that hedge funds are often just a combination or bundle of these risk factors including carry, trend, momentum, value, and volatility across the set of asset classes of equity, rates, currency, credit, and commodities. 

Some hedge funds specialize in a style or asset class. Some hedge fund managers are discretionary and others are systematic. Most can be described through alternative risk premia (ARP) bank swaps which are total return swaps linked to an index that is associated with a well-defined risk factor. It is an alternative way of accessing risk factors. It does not mean that the bank ARPs are better or have special skills, and it does not mean that good hedge funds are not available. It is just another way of investing in risk factors. 

The folks at Premia Labs, the bank swap data provider, have compared a bundle ARP swaps against the SPX and HFR equity hedge fund index and find that a global cross-sectional, equity multi-factor, and global trend ARPs performed well during the first quarter. Additionally, when focused style risk factors are compared with  hedge funds indices, they have provided better returns for the first quarter of 2020.



The cross-asset trend and merger arbitrage ARP indices did better than comparable HFR indices. The outperformance may be caused by the index construction. It can also be caused by what may be a fee advantage with doing the total return swap which does not charge a management and incentive fee. At the least, ARPs returns should be compared with similar styled hedge funds. For example, the choice set for trend-followers should include not just a representative sample of hedge funds but a set of available ARP trend swaps. 

The search for diversification and return generation should be broadened during these crisis times to include liquid bank swap products. Bank risk has increased but so has the risk of hedge fund illiquidity and failure. The delivery choice set for any risk exposure should be maximized and then assessed to find the best ways to access risks.