Friday, March 12, 2010

The EMU and optimal currency areas – it may never have been a good fit

Another core issue with Greece and the euro is whether the optimal currency area model used to drive the EMU ever fit Europe. The EMU was based on the assumption that Europe was fit as an optimal currency area. The hope of “one currency, one market” was just that, a hope not based on economic reality.[1] When we list the conditions for a common currency region, it is not surprising that euro uncertainty became reality.

The criteria for an optimal currency area are threefold:

· a high degree of trade interaction, so the area will not see asymmetric shocks that will affect one country and not others (correlated business cycles)

· a high degree of labor mobility or wage flexibility

· centralized fiscal policy that can allow for money transfers

The trade interaction across the EU is not balanced. Labor mobility across cultural lines is still not easy within the EU especially for those less educated. There is no centralized fiscal authority that can tax one set of countries and use proceeds for balancing budgets for others.

The regional uncertainty and instability now more than ever will place an overhang on the euro which will be hard to model. While we can easily measure the sovereign risks of any one part, the integration of these parts or the solution to any problem with one country member creates market uncertainty without a change in the political structure.




[1] The gravity model of trade suggests that bilateral trade is a function of distance, similar preference, and income as well as culture. The pull between some countries in the EU may be weaker than would be expected by just geographic distance. The politics of the EMU were driven by the view that one currency would lead to one market. This assumption or at least the speed of integration was not fast enough relative the chance of a fiscal shock.


China/US - German/EU similar trade problems

Most of the policy discussions in global finance have been about the trade imbalance between China’s current account surplus and the US’s current account deficit. Of course, this gap has closed markedly with the recession but the trade imbalance continues to be the focus of many who are worried about the composition of the global recovery. The imbalance problem has driven arguments for a yuan appreciation.

What has been less emphasized is the imbalance on the other side of the world between Germany and the rest of the EU.[1] This imbalance contributes to the Greek sovereign risk problem and the EUR decline. An EMU imbalance makes the PIGS debtors to Germany and to a less extent France. What is called for with a China imbalance is a revaluation, yet this is not possible in the current EMU. There has to either be a transfer payment (default/bail-out) or large real wage adjustment in Greece. The euro may now need a rebalance adjustment premium that will overhang the exchange rate.



[1] Both Germany and France have savings rates above 10% while Greece has a rate as measured by the OECD that is negative. The trade imbalance is reflected in savings imbalances.

Deficit problems across all of Europe


26 of 27 EU members will have deficits that exceed the Stability and Growth Pact limit of 3%. Four will have deficits that are above 10%, Iceland 14.7%, UK, 12.9%, Greece 12.2% and Spain 10.1%. The Stability and Growth Pact allows for the deficits to exceed the 3% limit for short-term periods but the idea is that this will move back to equilibrium once a recession is over. Unfortunately, the overall debt to GDP numbers are high and rising.

Looking at the debt as a percentage of GDP, the EU set a limit of 60%. 13 countries exceed this number. The US also is above 60%.

There is a broad developed world deficit problem that exceeds the issues with Greece. Greece is just a test case of what may be in store for Europe.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Reviewing Graham and Dodd




As Benjamin Graham and David Dodd wrote following the Great Depression (Security Analysis, 1934),

“The‘new-era’ doctrine – that ‘good’ stocks (or ‘blue chips’) were sound investments regardless of how high the price paid for them — was at bottom only a means for rationalizing under the title of ‘investment’ the well-nigh universal capitulation to the gambling fever… Why did the investing public turn its attention from dividends, from asset values, and from earnings, to transfer it almost exclusively to the earnings trend? The answer was, first, that the records of the past were proving an undependable guide to investment; and secondly, that the rewards offered by the future had become irresistibly alluring … The notion that the desirability of a common stock was entirely independent of its prices seems incredibly absurd. Yet the new-era theory led directly to this thesis.”

For all that has been written about bubbles and bad behavior during this recession, it seems like going back to basics always makes sense. This is applicable for any market.